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Theory and Applications
Environmental controls with corrupt
bureaucrats
RICHARD DAMANIA
School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide 5001, Australia.
Email: richard.damania@adelaide.edu.au
ABSTRACT. Environmental regulations typify a large class of activities in the public
sector where government agencies are required to monitor the degree of compliance.
These tasks are usually delegated to bureaucrats who, as self-interested agents, may
engage in corrupt behavior. Such problems abound, particularly in developing coun-
tries, where corruption is regarded as one of the major causes of environmental
degradation. This paper investigates the implications of corruption for the optimal
design of environmental regulations and analyses the interaction between the prosecu-
tion rate, monitoring rate, and fines. It is shown that even if corruption can be deterred
the fact that it may occur substantially impedes the ability of a regulator to control
environmentally degrading activities.
1. Introduction
Government regulators confront problems resulting from the need to del-
egate administrative authority to bureaucrats, who act as their agents. The
bureaucrats are thus endowed with discretionary powers. If they are
assumed to be self interested, these delegated powers may be exploited for
personal gain, rather than the purposes intended by the policy makers.
Such problems abound, particularly in developing countries, where cor-
ruption has been shown to undermine government policy
(Rose-Ackerman, 1977), impede economic growth (Mauro, 1995), and stifle
the entry of new enterprises and technologies (Bardhan, 1997; Krueger,
1990; Manion, 1996).
In recent years corruption has intensified in a new domain—environ-
mental regulation. The introduction and ratification of increasing numbers
of global environmental agreements has compelled governments to intro-
duce new and more stringent environmental controls. This, in turn, has
expanded the sphere of activities through which corrupt administrators
Environment and Development Economics 7: 407–427 © 2002 Cambridge University Press
DOI:10.1017/S1355770X02000256 Printed in the United Kingdom
The author acknowledges with gratitude the extremely helpful and incisive com-
ments of two anonymous referees, Per Fredriksson and Daniel Leonard. The
usual disclaimer applies.
can extract bribes. Examples of such international agreements include the
Rio Earth Summit and the CITES convention on trade in endangered
species.1
The emerging literature on environmental performance indicates that
corruption is one of the main sources of environmental damage in several
countries. For instance, Desai (1998) in a comparative study of ten coun-
tries concludes that:
corruption is a major culprit in environmental degradation. In many
industrializing countries, petty corruption by mid and low level offi-
cials and bureaucrats both at the center and local level is widespread
and endemic. Environmental regulations often are observed only in
the breach. (page 300)
Similarly, in an econometric study of water pollution, Pargal, Mani, and
Huq (1997) find that even when increased emissions prompt further
inspections, these have no subsequent impact on total emissions.
Corruption and inadequate penalties for violations are identified as the
main factors contributing to non-compliance.
In a survey of environmental regulations O’Connor (1994: 94) highlights
an analogous problem:
In several countries studied here, the monitoring problem is com-
pounded by weak enforcement. In short, when violators of standards
are detected . . . polluters are exempted from fines . . . because of the
power they wield.2
Despite the prevalence of these problems, the consequences of bribery on
environmental policy outcomes remains one of the least-researched
aspects of economic behavior. This paper extends the existing literature by
analyzing a situation where environmental regulations create oppor-
tunities for corrupt behavior. We derive a rule to determine the optimum
degree of regulation and show how it differs from the conventional
Pigouvian solution for correcting externalities. The paper further analyzes
the interaction between the level of environmental regulation, the required
degree of monitoring, and penalties for corruption. It is shown that, even
if corruption can be deterred, the fact that it may occur substantially
impedes the ability of a regulator to control environmentally degrading
activities.
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1 For instance the CITES convention calls for a complete ban on the commercial use
and trade of species listed in Appendix 1. This, however, has done little to halt
the illegal trade of tiger bones and organs from India to China, Taiwan, and Japan
or rhinoceros horns from Africa and India to SE Asia—both of which are
demanded for their presumed therapeutic value (TRAFFIC International, 1998).
2 Heyes and Rickman (1999) and Harrington (1988) show that exempting violators
from penalties may be optimal in some contexts. This is likely to be so if toler-
ating violations in one period or sphere of policy induces greater compliance in
other periods or policy areas. Thus, O’Connor’s observation may be consistent
with welfare maximization. In contrast, the violations considered in this paper
occur as a consequence of corruption and by assumption confer no other environ-
mental benefits.
The study of corruption in an environmental context seems
important for several reasons. Firstly, environmental issues are repre-
sentative of a larger class of problems where the government delegates
powers to self-interested bureaucrats. Thus, the results outlined in this
paper may have wider applicability. In addition, many of the more
acute problems of pollution and bio-diversity preservation are encoun-
tered in developing countries with high levels of corruption.3
Accordingly, analyzing the interaction between environmental controls
and corruption is of some relevance for environmental policy purposes.
Finally, in international forums, such as the WTO, environmental issues
have been a major source of contention. Thus, an understanding of
factors that promote and inhibit corruption associated with environ-
mental regulations and the limits to such regulations is of practical
importance.
Much of the existing theoretical work on corruption deals with moni-
toring problems which arise in a hierarchical structure when a principal
(such as the government) confers supervisory powers upon a self-
interested agent (say an inspector). The literature explores whether bribe
taking can be deterred through incentive payments and fines. The central
conclusions which emerge are that: marginal increases in a fine imposed
on the bribe taker leads to higher bribes being paid in equilibrium
(Mookherjee and Png, 1995). In contrast, penalties imposed on the bribe
giver, unambiguously reduce the level of corruption (Basu, Bhattacharya,
and Mishra, 1992). Payment of a sufficiently high efficiency wage dimin-
ishes the gains from bribe taking and may under certain conditions deter
corruption (Besley and McLaren, 1993).
A distinct literature on environmental regulation has also developed,
which focuses upon compliance behavior and penalties (Keller, 1991;
Malik, 1990; van Egteren and Weber, 1996; Heyes and Rickman, 1999).
However, to our knowledge the problem of corruption has been largely
ignored in the growing literature on environmental compliance.
Corruption has two non-trivial characteristics which makes the real
effects of environmental regulations very different from their legal prop-
erties. First, when bureaucrats accept bribes this has the effect of diluting
the sanctions for non-compliance. Since the expected penalty for non-com-
pliance declines, it can be more difficult for the regulator to control the
environmentally degrading activity. More importantly, corruption usually
flourishes in situations where information can be concealed from a regu-
lator. Thus, policies must be based on the (potentially) distorted
information provided by a bureaucrat. The aim of this paper is to address
these and other related issues, which to our knowledge have not been pre-
viously examined.
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3 While statistical estimates are hard to obtain because of the clandestine nature of
corrupt activities, examples abound. Some striking cases include: the widely pub-
licized illegal burning of forests in Sumatra and the consequent pallor of smog
across Singapore and Malaysia (The Economist, 18 August 1999), forest clearance
in Madagascar (World Bank, 1999), organized poaching of tigers and elephants
and the buoyant illegal trade (Damania, 2001).
We consider a stylized model in which a firm emits pollution which a
government regulator attempts to control through an emission tax.4 The
regulator cannot directly observe the level of pollution emitted and there-
fore employs an environmental inspector to monitor pollution levels. The
tax paid by the firm is therefore based on the level of emissions reported
by the inspector. This clearly creates an opportunity for the inspector and
firm to engage in corrupt behavior by colluding and underreporting true
emission levels. The regulator chooses to undertake an audit of the firm’s
emissions with some probability which is linked to the regulator’s expec-
tation that emissions have been underreported. With some exogenously
given probability, the audit unearths true emission levels and a fine is
imposed on both the firm (briber) and environmental inspector (recipient
of the bribe) for underreporting discharge levels.
The analysis is based on the following sequence of events. In the first
period the government sets the policy instruments (that is, the emission tax
schedule, penalty for underreporting emissions, and the audit schedule).
In the second stage, the firm is visited by an inspector who is assigned the
task of reporting emission levels to the regulator. If the firm offers the
inspector a bribe, actual and reported emissions are chosen to maximize
the joint payoffs of the firm and inspector. The resulting bribe is deter-
mined by a Nash bargain. As usual, the model is solved by backward
induction.
We begin by determining the equilibrium level of reported and actual
emissions and examine the response of each to changes in various policy
instruments. It is shown that an increase in the emission tax has the pre-
dictable effect of inducing a decline in both reported emissions and actual
pollution. Reported emissions fall because a higher tax raises the cost of
compliance and thus increases the payoffs from tax evasion. On the other
hand, actual emissions decline because the tax increases costs so that
output and emission levels fall. It is further demonstrated that a higher fine
for corruption leads to an increase in reported emissions. This simply
reflects the fact that the fine dilutes the expected gains from bribery.
However, in some circumstances a higher fine is shown to increase actual
emissions. This occurs only when the judicial system is highly inefficient,
in the sense that the probability of being prosecuted lies below a threshold
level. Intuitively, since a higher fine leads to an increase in reported emis-
sions, the firm is compelled to pay more tax (on the reported emissions).
When the prosecution rate is sufficiently low, the firm seeks to recover
these costs by increasing actual discharges.
These results suggest that controlling emissions and the degree of com-
pliance is likely to be a complex process, which depends upon the
responsiveness of actual and reported emissions to each policy instrument.
Moreover, the regulator is compelled to determine the optimal policy mix
without being able to observe true emission levels. A rational regulator,
who relies on reported emissions, will predict that the firm and inspector
will collude and underreport emissions, if it is to their advantage. From the
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4 In order to abstract from problems of firm strategic behavior we focus on the case
of a single monopolist.
revelation principle it is known that in these circumstances the regulator’s
optimal response can be restricted to the set of policies which induce the
firm and inspector to truthfully reveal emission levels (Laffont and Tirole,
1998: 120). Accordingly, section 3 derives the welfare-maximizing response
under the constraint that truthful revelation is incentive compatible.
It is demonstrated that in the presence of corruption the optimum set of
policies have certain distinctive properties. Firstly, in the welfare-maxi-
mizing equilibrium the pollution tax and audit rate must be set such that
the net marginal welfare gains from each are equalized. Intuitively, higher
taxes induce greater corruption, which in turn necessitates greater
auditing. Since auditing is costly, the optimum policy weighs the net mar-
ginal benefits from auditing against those from the emission tax. This rule
thus differs from the conventional (Pigouvian) approach which requires
that the emission tax be set equal to the marginal damage from pollution.
The requirement that truthful revelation is incentive compatible places
further important restrictions on the tax and audit schedules. It is shown
that truthtelling requires a tax schedule that rises at a decreasing rate (that
is, is concave) in emissions. Intuitively, when the tax rises at a diminishing
rate, this weakens the incentive to engage in corrupt behavior as emission
levels increase. Truthful revelation also requires that the audit rate must
decline at a decreasing rate in reported emissions (that is, be convex in
reported emissions). Such an audit schedule ensures that low reports are
audited more intensively, and that the audit rate does not decline too
rapidly as reported emissions rise. Thus, a low polluter (who faces the
more steeply rising segment of the tax schedule) is deterred from underre-
porting because of the higher audit rates. In contrast, a high polluter is
induced to report honestly because of the gradually rising taxes which
accompany the slowly declining audit rates.
A further result which emerges is that if the prosecution rate is
extremely low, which occurs when the judicial system is highly inefficient,
the optimum solution is to abandon attempts to regulate emissions.
Intuitively, since there is no workable mechanism to enforce compliance,
there is little point in expending resources on auditing emissions. If emis-
sions are not audited there is complete non-compliance. Thus, zero
pollution taxes are optimal. In policy terms low prosecutions are most
likely when the judicial system is in need of institutional reform. In these
circumstances environmental controls simply induce greater corruption,
but do little to prevent the ensuing damage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the basic model and investigates the impact of the policy instruments on
actual and reported emissions levels. Section 3 deals with the welfare-max-
imizing response of the regulator and section 4 concludes the paper.
2. The model
A firm which discharges pollution emissions, denoted e  [e, e¯ ] is visited by
an environmental inspector who reports its emission levels to a regulatory
agency.5 The regulator imposes an emission tax, which is levied on
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5 The basic structure of the model is similar to that of Mookherjee and Png (1995).
reported pollution emissions of ê. The emission tax burden is denoted t(ê,
), where  is the tax rate on reported emissions. It is assumed that t/ê 
0 and t/  0, so that the tax burden is increasing in both reported emis-
sions and the tax rate.
The firm may seek to lower its tax burden by offering the inspector a
bribe of B to underreport emissions. An inspector who accepts a bribe,
reports emission levels ê, which differs from actual emissions of e. We
assume that ê  e, so that the inspector is unable to exaggerate true pol-
lution levels. This implies that the firm can provide irrefutable evidence of
emission levels to the regulatory agency, if it so chooses. The inspector
receives a fixed wage of w from the regulator.6
The regulatory authority cannot observe actual emission levels. In
keeping with the mechanism design literature (see, for example, Baron and
Myreson, 1982; Laffont and Tirole, 1998) we adopt the Bayesian approach
and assume that the regulator has some prior probability distribution for
the unknown parameter, e, prior to receiving a report from the inspector.
We let (e) be the density function and (e) the cumulative distribution
function. Then the probability that the regulator attaches to reported emis-
sions (ê) being less than actual discharges (e) is given by (ê) 	 (1
 (ê)).7
Based on this expectation of emissions being underreported, the regulator
initiates an audit of emission levels with some probability  	  ((ê)). It is
supposed that the audit rate (), is increasing in the probability that emis-
sions are underreported. Hence, /  0, /ê  0.8 The probability
that an audit, once initiated, successfully detects true pollution levels and
leads to a prosecution is exogenously given by   (0, 1). Thus  may be
viewed as an indicator of the efficiency of the judicial process.9 The prob-
ability that an audit occurs and leads to a successful prosecution is:  	 .
Having specified the monitoring regime, we now describe the penalties
for underreporting emissions. Typically, the penalty for a misdemeanor is
linked to the extent of a crime (Shapiro, 1988). Following judicial conven-
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6 The results continue to hold if the inspector is assumed to receive some fraction
(less than unity) of the tax revenue. However, the assumption of a fixed wage is
simple and realistic. It more accurately reflects the (non-performance-based)
mode of remuneration in the public sector in most countries.
7 As noted by a referee, the probability of underreporting is likely to be influenced
by the type and stringency of the chosen policy. This implies that the expected
probability will be conditional upon the policy regime. While this is clearly a
more realistic assumption, for reasons of analytical tractability we follow the
existing literature and ignore this important issue
8 Note that /ê 	 (/)(/ê) 	 
(/)(ê)  0. Given the informational
structure of the model, this audit rule can be shown to be optimal in the sense that
it induces greater compliance than the other main auditing rules which involve
either (i) a fixed probability of monitoring, or (ii) a monitoring regime which
increases with reported emissions. In note 13 we show that these rules result in a
solution with lower reported emissions, and greater non-compliance.
9 As suggested by a referee, there are alternative interpretations of . It may be
viewed as a measure of the proportion of honest bureaucrats in the judiciary, or
as in Klitgaard (1998) it may proxy the pervasiveness of corruption in society at
large.
tion we allow for the possibility that the fines for corruption depend on the
level of underreporting. Let v 	 (e 
 ê) denote the level of underreporting
of emissions. It is assumed that an inspector found guilty of underre-
porting emissions is fined an amount I(v, )  0, while the firm is fined an
amount f(v, )  0; where  defines the penalty rate. As seems reasonable,
the fines for corruption are increasing in the penalty rate () and the level
of underreporting (v) at an increasing rate.10 That is, for K 	 I(v, ), f(v, )
it is supposed that K/v  0, 2K/v2  0, K/  0, 2K/2  0 and
2K/v  0.
We begin by defining the gains to a firm from corruption. Given the
sequential structure of the model, the level of emissions which eventuate
in equilibrium will depend on expected taxes and fines. Let e 	 e(t(ê), f(v,),
) denote emission levels under corrupt behavior. Profits from emission
levels (e), gross of taxes, bribes and fines, are
G(e) 	 P(e)e 
 C(e)
where P(e) is price of the polluting good and C(e) is production costs. For
simplicity we ignore pollution abatement costs which could be incorpor-
ated into the cost function without altering any of the main results.
Similarly, let eh 	 e(t(e)) denote emissions under honest behavior, then the
corresponding gross profits are defined by
G(eh) 	 P(eh)eh 
 C(eh)
with P/e  0, C/e  0, 2C/e2  0 and 2G/e2  0.11
Suppose that the firm decides to bribe the inspector an amount B  0 to
report emissions ê  e. The expected gains to the firm from offering a bribe
is given by
UF 	 [G(e) 
 (B  t(ê)  f (v,))] 
 [G(eh) 
 t(eh)] (1)
where for notational brevity t(ê) 	 t(,ê) and t(eh) 	 t(,eh) define the firm’s
tax burden under corruption and honest behavior respectively.
To interpret expression (1), note that the terms in the first square paren-
thesis represent the expected payoffs to the firm from paying a bribe. Thus,
with emissions of e, profits gross of taxes, bribes and fines are G(e). The
remaining terms define the expected costs of a bribe. A bribe of B induces
the inspector to report ê, so that the firm pays emission taxes t(ê). With
probability  a successful audit is triggered and the firm is fined f(v,). The
terms in the second square parenthesis represent the payoffs when the firm
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10 Considering alternative penalty structures, while useful, would substantially
expand the range of cases to be considered in the model. More generally, from
the first-order condition in (4), it can be shown that the assumption of fines
increasing in v is optimal in the sense that a non-increasing penalty schedule
results in lower reported emissions.
11 To economize on notation no superscript is used to denote emissions under cor-
ruption, while superscript h indicates emissions under honest behavior. When
the distinction between corrupt and honest behavior is not required (as occurs
when truthful revelation is induced) the superscript is ignored for notational
brevity.
does not offer a bribe. A firm that does not offer a bribe receives gross
profits of G(eh) and pays taxes on actual emissions of t(eh).12
Similarly, the gains to an inspector from accepting a bribe of B is given
by
UI 	 [w  B 
 I(v,)] 
 w (2)
The first term in (2) is the fixed salary (w) received by the inspector. An
inspector who chooses to accept a bribe, receives an amount B, which
induces a report of ê. With probability  a successful audit is initiated and
leads to a fine I(v,) being imposed. The last term represents the payoffs
from honest behavior: an inspector who does not accept a bribe simply
receives a fixed salary of w.
By backward induction we begin by solving for the level of reported and
actual emissions. Given a tax rate, the firm and inspector will choose
reported and actual pollution to maximize the joint expected payoffs from
a bribe of B. Specifically
Max
ê,e
J ≡ (Uf  UI) (3)
Solving the associated first-order conditions yields
	 
   	 0 (4)
	 
 
  	 0 (5)
where  	 
F   , F 	 I(v,)  f(v,).
Thus, equation (4) suggests that the equilibrium report satisfies the
condition that the marginal tax cost of increasing reported emissions (that
is, t(ê)/ê), is equated to the marginal expected cost of being prosecuted
(that is, ). In contrast, by equation (5) emissions are determined by
equating the marginal benefits from production (that is G(e)/e), to the
expected marginal cost of a fine from higher emissions (that is  F/v).























12 For simplicity we ignore the possibility of corruption further up the hierarchy
(for example at the prosecution stage). The issue of corruption in hierarchies has
been explored in detail by Basu, Bhattacharya, and Mishra (1992). Hierarchical
corruption could be incorporated into the model as follows: let i be the propor-
tion of honest bureaucrats at stage i 	 1, 2, . . . in the monitoring hierarchy. For i
 1, the inspector in stage (i
1) may bribe the stage i bureaucrat who monitors
her. In a two-level hierarchy the expected payoff to the firm from offering a bribe
is then (1 
 1)[G(e) 
 (B  t(ê)  2f(v,))]. As shown by Basu Bhattacharya,
and Mishra (1992) and Sanyal (2000) this alters the equilibrium parameters over
which bribery occurs, but does not change the qualitative properties captured in
the simpler model of equation (1). We therefore ignore the complications of hier-
archical corruption hereafter.
effect on actual emissions, the tax on pollution () only has an indirect
impact through its effect on the expected fine.13
Once reported emission levels have been decided, the equilibrium bribe
is determined by a Nash bargain between the firm and each inspector.
Each party is assumed to have equal bargaining power and the bribe is




This results in an outcome where the firm and inspector equally share
the net benefits from underreporting the true level of emissions. The equi-
librium bribe can be deduced to be
B 	 (G(e) 
 G(eh) 
 t(ê)  t(eh) 
 (f(v,) 
 I(v,))) (7)
Equation (7) reveals that the equilibrium bribe is declining in the fine
imposed on the firm (that is, f(v,)). Suppose that there are costs associated
with auditing. Then, since the bribe is declining in f(v,)), all corruption can
be eliminated at an arbitrarily small audit cost, by levying a high fine
which approaches infinity with an audit rate which is arbitrarily close to
zero. To rule out this unrealistic case, we assume that the fines are bounded
above by the after-tax income of each agent (that is, a limited liability con-
straint is imposed). Thus, the least-upper-bound of the firms’ penalty is
given by (G(e) 
 t(ê)), and that of the inspector by w.14 For future reference,
note that when fines are set at the maximum levels the equilibrium bribe is
B 	 ((G(e) 
 t(ê))(1 
 ) 
 G(eh)  t(eh) 
 w) (8a)
The first-order condition (5) then simplifies to
	 (1 
 ) 	 0 (8b)
The following useful properties of the equilibrium, illustrate certain
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13 Having derived the equilibrium report, we can now provide a heuristic argument to
demonstrate that an audit rate () which is declining in ê is optimal. More rigorous
proofs of this result have been established elsewhere (see, for example, Border and
Sobel, 1987). Suppose instead that /ê  0. Compare the FOC in (4) when /ê 
0 with that when /ê  0. Observe that the expected marginal cost of being pros-
ecuted , is lower when /ê  0. Thus reported emissions and compliance is also
lower in this case. Since pollution is easier to control with more honest reporting, it
can be shown that an audit schedule with /ê  0 is optimal for the regulator.
14 The assumption of an exogenously given upper bound on penalties, while widely
employed in the literature, is clearly an unsatisfactory feature of models of cor-
ruption. The question as to why governments do not eradicate all misdemeanors
by imposing draconian penalties is yet to be resolved. Fortunately the compara-
tive statics below hold for non-maximal fines.
Lemma 1a
 0  f(v,)  (0,(G(e) 
 t(ê))] and  I(v,)  (0, w]
Lemma 1a reveals that ceteris paribus an exogenous increase in the tax rate
leads to lower reporting of emissions. Intuitively, a higher tax raises the
costs of compliance and thus increases the payoffs from tax evasion.
Accordingly, as the tax rate rises, reported emissions fall.
Lemma 1b
 0  f(v,)  (0,(G(e) 
 t(ê))) and  I(v,)  (0, w]
Lemma 1b suggests that an increase in the tax rate leads to a reduction in
actual pollution levels. This simply reflects the fact that higher taxes raise
the costs of emitting pollution and hence result in lower discharges.
Lemma 1c
	 
  0  f(v,)  (0,(G(e) 
 t(ê))] and  I(v,)  (0, w]
Lemma 1c reveals that higher taxes, by increasing the incentive to under-
report, lead to lower levels of compliance.
Lemma 2a
 0  f(v,)  (0,(G(e) 
 t(ê))] and  I(v,)  (0, w]
Lemma 2a summarizes the predictable result that an increase in the
penalty rate, which raises the cost of a fine, dilutes the expected gains from
corruption. Since the payoffs from corruption are lower, there is greater
reporting of emissions.
Lemma 2b
 0 if   ¯, and  0 if   ¯,
 f(v,)  (0,(G(e) 





 F    
   
Finally, Lemma 2b reveals that if the prosecution rate () lies below a
certain threshold level (¯), then a higher penalty rate () results in an
increase in emissions. This seemingly counterintuitive result arises for the



























































induces an increase in reported emissions (Lemma 2a). Hence the firm is
compelled to pay more tax on the reported emissions. The firm knows that
when reported emissions (ê) increase, then ceteris paribus, the audit rate ()
declines, so that the probability of being prosecuted falls. When  lies
below the threshold level, the firm seeks to recover these costs by
increasing actual emissions.
These results suggest that controlling emissions in this setting is likely to
be a complicated process which depends on the responsiveness of e and ê
to each policy instrument. The regulator’s problem is further complicated
by the fact that policies must be based on reported rather than observed
emission levels. The following section explores these issues in greater
detail.
3. The welfare-maximizing policy response
This section analyzes the welfare-maximizing response of the regulator.
A rational regulator who relies on reported emissions, will anticipate
that the inspector and firm will collude to misreport emissions, when-
ever it is to their advantage. The regulator is therefore confronted with a
problem of hidden information.15 As is well known from the revelation
principle, in these circumstances the regulator’s optimal response can be
restricted to the set of policies which induce the firm and inspector to
honestly reveal the true level of emissions (Laffont and Tirole, 1998: 120).
When truthful revelation is optimal for the firm and inspector, it is incen-
tive compatible. Thus, we begin by deriving the incentive compatibility
constraints.
Honest reporting will be individually rational for the firm if the payoffs
from truthful revelation exceed those from corrupt behavior. Thus, for any
given level of emissions, truthful revelation occurs if the costs to the firm
associated with corruption exceed those from honest revelation. This
implies that for a given e  [e_, e
_
]
t(e)  t(ê)  B  f(v) (9a)
Substituting for B, and rearranging, equation (9a) simplifies to
t(e)  t(ê)  F (9b)
Let (9b) hold as an equality, then differentiating with respect to e (using the
first-order condition in (4))
	 (10a)
Equation (10a) asserts that truthtelling is incentive compatible when the
marginal expected cost of a fine ( F/v) equals the marginal increase in
the tax burden (t(e)/e) . For future reference we note that when fines are
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15 Much of the literature on both environmental compliance and corruption appears
to have ignored this aspect of the problem.
	 (10b)
Thus, truthtelling occurs if the policies vary with e in the manner described
by equations (10a) and (10b).16
Having defined the incentive compatibility conditions, we now specify
the regulator’s objective function. Pollution emissions cause external
damage, described by the damage function, denoted D(e). As usual, it is
supposed that pollution damage is increasing in emission levels and
convex: D/e  0, 2D/e2  0. It is further assumed that there are costs
associated with auditing, a(), which increase with the probability of an
audit at an increasing rate: a/  0, 2a/2  0.
The regulator maximizes a utilitarian welfare function which is given by
the total payoffs of all the agents in the model. Social welfare is thus given
by the sum of profits, inspector’s payoffs, government revenue from taxes
and fines, less government spending on monitoring and inspectors wages,
less the damage from pollution.17 Upon simplification the welfare function
is
W(e) 	 G 
 D(e) 
 a() (11a)
Since actual emissions are not observed, the regulator must maximize
expected social welfare. As noted earlier, the regulator has some prob-
ability density function (e) for the unknown parameter (e), prior to
receiving a report from the inspector. The cumulative distribution function




By the revelation principle, the regulator maximizes expected welfare,
subject to the constraint that truthtelling is incentive compatible.
We begin by outlining a general property of the equilibrium which
allows discussion of the welfare-maximizing solution to be restricted to
circumstances in which there is a feasible solution. Since auditing is costly,
welfare is maximized by choosing the policy mix that minimizes the audit
costs (a()) of achieving any given level of emissions. Lemma 3 explores











16 An identical condition holds for the inspector. Intuitively, the incentive compat-
ibility constraint for the inspector is the same because in equilibrium the firm and
inspector equally share the benefits of underreporting. Thus, without loss of gen-
erality, attention can be focused just on truthtelling by the firm.
17 The firm’s payoffs are G 
 t 
 B 
 f (v,), the inspector’s utility is w  B 
 
I (v,), the government’s utility is t  F(v,) 
 a() 
 w and finally pollution
damage is D(e). Summing these yields equation (11a). The usual utilitarian
welfare function has the unappealing feature that payoffs from all sources (legal
and illegal) are given equal weight. Thus, if total payoffs increase with corrup-
tion, bribery would be welfare improving. Moreover, as noted by a referee, such
a function also implies that under usual assumptions about the utility function,
theft by the poor from the rich can be welfare improving.
Lemma 3a
If the prosecution rate   ¯, then the audit costs of achieving a given level of
emissions are minimized if fines are set at the maximum feasible level (i.e. f(v,) 	
(G(e) 
 t(ê)) and I(v,) 	 w)).
Proof Suppose that   ¯, but that 0  f(v,)  (G(e) 
 t(ê)) and 0  I(v,)
 w. Then the fine can be increased and audit rate decreased such that the
expected penalty for bribery (F) is unchanged. Hence, by the FOC in
equation (5) actual emissions can not increase. Since a/  0, lowering
the audit rate () reduces audit costs (a). Since e does not increase, but audit
costs fall as the fine rises, it follows that setting fines at their maximum
levels (that is f(v,) 	 (G(e) 
 t(ê)) and I(v,) 	 w) minimizes the audit costs
of achieving a given level of emissions, e.
Intuitively, if   ¯, the prosecution rate is sufficiently great so that high
fines have the usual effect of deterring corrupt behavior. In this case it is
clearly optimal for the regulator to set the fine at the highest feasible level
in order to minimize on audit costs. Thus, there is no loss of generality in
focusing on the case where fines are at the maximum level when the pros-
ecution rate exceeds the threshold level (that is,   ¯).
Lemma 3b
If   ¯, then the audit cost of achieving a given level of emissions are minimized
if fines are set at f(v,) 	 I(v,) 	 0.
Proof Suppose that   ¯, but that 0  f(v,)  (G(e) 
 t(e)) and 0  I(v,)
 w. Then the fine can be decreased and audit rate lowered such that
actual emissions do not increase. Since a/  0, lowering the audit rate
reduces monitoring costs and raises welfare. It follows that lowering fines
to the lowest feasible level f(v,) 	 I(v,) 	 0 minimizes the audit costs of
achieving a given level of emissions.
When   ¯, higher fines induce greater pollution and there is no effective
mechanism for deterring corrupt behavior. In this situation it is optimal for
the regulator to set the lowest feasible fine. More generally, it is shown in
Proposition 4 below, that when    there are no feasible policies for con-
trolling emissions in this problem.
When   ¯ the regulator’s problem is to maximize expected social
welfare, subject to the constraints that truthtelling is incentive compatible
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18 We do not include the usual individual rationality constraint which requires that
the firm’s payoffs exceed the next best alternative, so that there is an incentive to
participate. This is because in the current context pollution damage may be so
high that it is optimal to have zero emissions. The individual rationality con-
straint would rule out this outcome.
F 	 (G 
 t(e)  w) (Maximum fines) (12c)
As in Laffont and Tirole (1998: 64) equations (12a) and (12b) can be
solved as an optimal control problem with an additional constraint (12c)
on the problem. The solution is presented in Appendix B. The following
propositions summarize the key properties of the welfare-maximizing
policy response.
Proposition 1
If   ¯ then:
(a) by Lemma 3a in the welfare-maximizing equilibrium the fine is set at the
maximum level.
(b) the emissions tax and audit rate are set such that the expected net marginal
welfare gain from each of these policy instruments is equalized i.e.
( 
 )(e)  W(e) 	 (e)( )
Proof See Appendix B.
Part (a) of Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 3a. It reflects the
fact that the regulator can save on audit costs by setting fines at the highest
feasible level. In part (b) of Proposition 1, the left-hand side defines the
expected marginal welfare effects of higher taxes, while the right-hand
side describes the expected marginal welfare effect of higher audit rates.
Proposition 1b asserts that the optimum tax and audit regimes are set such
that the expected net marginal benefit from a higher tax is equated to the
expected increase in the marginal cost of auditing. To see why this is
necessary, recall that higher taxes induce greater corruption, which in turn
requires more auditing. Since auditing is costly, the optimum policy must
trade-off the benefits from taxation against those from auditing. This con-
trasts with the conventional Pigouvian tax rule which requires that, absent
corruption, the tax must be set equal to the net marginal damage from pol-
lution. With the possibility of corruption, the regulator must take account
of the additional inefficiencies associated with the incentive to evade
higher taxes.
Proposition 2
If   ¯ then the equilibrium tax burden rises at a diminishing rate with reported
emissions (that is the tax schedule is strictly concave:  0).
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 requires that in equilibrium the emission tax burden must
rise at a decreasing rate with reported emissions. Intuitively, keeping the
tax burden relatively low as pollution levels rise, provides the firm with a
greater incentive to honestly report emissions when pollution levels are
increasing. The relatively low tax paid by high polluters can be viewed as


























tional advantage. Stated differently, asymmetric information forces the
regulator to engage in costly auditing. To mitigate these costs the policy is
distorted in favor of the polluter. The slowly rising tax schedule is thus a
consequence of the truth telling constraint in the welfare maximization
problem.
Proposition 3
If   ¯ and if the tax burden rises sufficiently slowly with emissions, then the
audit rate must decline at a decreasing rate with reported emissions (that is if the
tax schedule is sufficiently concave, then the audit function must be convex
 0).
Proof See Appendix B.
When the audit rate declines at a decreasing rate (that is, is convex), low
reports are audited relatively more intensively than high reports. This is
necessary for two reasons. Firstly, note that with a concave tax schedule,
the tax burden rises relatively steeply when pollution levels are low. There
is therefore a relatively stronger marginal incentive to avoid the tax at low
pollution levels. If underreporting is to be prevented at low pollution
levels, the regulator must audit the low reports more intensively. This is
clearly achieved with an audit schedule which is declining and convex in
reported emissions. Secondly, recall that pollution damage is increasing at
an increasing rate in emissions. Thus, when emission levels are high, the
damage from pollution is high. Welfare considerations therefore dictate
that emissions at high pollution levels continue to be monitored in order to
strengthen the firm’s incentive to comply with the regulation. This in turn
requires that the audit rate does not decline too rapidly as reported emis-
sions rise. Once again this can be achieved with a convex audit schedule.
Proposition 4
If   ¯ then there is no feasible tax, penalty or audit rate which satisfies the
necessary conditions for a maximum.
Proof See Appendix B.
Intuitively, when  lies below a threshold level ¯, the prosecution rate is
low and there is no effective penalty available to the regulator to deter
corrupt behavior. Since there is no workable mechanism to enforce com-
pliance, there is little point in expending resources on auditing emissions.
If auditing does not occur, there is complete evasion of the tax. Thus, the
optimal solution is to abandon attempts to regulate emissions.
4. Conclusions
Global environmental problems in both developed and developing coun-
tries have been at the centre of controversy in a number of international
forums such as the Rio Earth Summit, the greenhouse gas meetings and
the ‘Millennium Round’ of trade talks in Seattle. However, corrective
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an understanding of policies which promote corruption and ways to
control it is of some importance. The existing literature on environmental
compliance appears to have largely ignored the effects of corruption on
environmental policy decisions. This paper has extended the literature by
analyzing the problem of pollution control in a corrupt bureaucracy.
The model focused on the case where policy makers confront a stark
choice between more stringent environmental regulations which increase
opportunities for corrupt behavior, and greater enforcement which raises
compliance costs. A number of new policy implications are suggested by
the analysis. It was demonstrated that the optimal policy depends critically
upon the efficiency of the judiciary, as defined by the prosecution rate. In
highly inefficient judiciaries with a low prosecution rate, the commonly
proposed expedient of harsher penalties for corruption was shown to
cause greater pollution. The analysis reveals that in this situation there is
little point in expending resources to control emissions unless the prose-
cution rate can be increased sufficiently.19 In policy terms, increasing the
prosecution rate would necessitate major institutional reform of the
judiciary, which may be difficult to achieve since many of the factors
which promote corruption are often those which preclude institutional
reforms.
Where the judicial system is sufficiently effective in prosecuting
offenders, the optimal response was shown to involve policies which
combine efforts to reduce corruption together with those which lower
emissions. Specifically, the welfare-maximizing policy requires that the net
marginal benefit from the instruments for corruption control and pollution
be equalized. This contrasts with the conventional (Pigouvian) approach
which calls for the emission tax to be set equal to the marginal damage
from pollution. In the current context, a higher tax creates stronger incen-
tives to underreport, which in turn requires greater auditing. In the
optimum solution the marginal benefits from taxation must therefore be
traded off against those from auditing. This result suggests that the gov-
ernment may be severely restricted in its ability to control emissions, if
auditing is sufficiently expensive. Moreover, it was shown that optimality
necessitates a tax schedule which rises at a decreasing rate with reported
emissions and an audit rate which declines at a decreasing rate with
reported emissions. This combination lowers the incentive to pay bribes as
emissions increase.20 The results therefore suggest the need for multifac-
eted policies which tackle problems of corruption and pollution
422 Richard Damania
19 Anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon is not hard to find. For instance, the
Wildlife Protection Society has documented cases of well-known poachers in
India pending trial for over 40 major breaches of the Conservation Act, who con-
tinue to hunt and trade openly in wild animal parts (WPSI, 2000). Similarly,
Pargal, Mani and Huq (1996) report that greater monitoring and reporting of pol-
lution was associated with higher levels of emissions.
20 It is of interest to note that this result is similar to that obtained in the literature
on optimal taxation with costly monitoring and no corruption. For instance,
Border and Sobel (1987) show that with monitoring costs the optimal tax
increases and audit rates decline with income.
simultaneously. This contrasts with the approach taken by policy makers
at both the domestic and international levels where problems of corruption
and environmental damage are typically dealt with separately in an ad hoc
and piecemeal manner (Desai, 1998).
It is worth noting that, while this paper has focused on the case of a pol-
lution tax, the qualitative results may extend to any other instrument of
environmental control, which raises compliance costs and requires moni-
toring by an agent. The increase in compliance costs creates an incentive to
avoid the environmental control, while the need to monitor compliance
creates an opportunity for agents to engage in corrupt behavior. Thus, the
results might apply to the other main instruments of pollution control such
as standards and pollution permits. It would be useful for future research
to determine which of these instruments creates stronger incentives to
engage in corrupt behavior. Another issue which warrants further research
is the role of corruption and rent seeking in a renewable resource context.
This is clearly important for the design of policies to control tropical defor-
estation and the preservation of endangered species.
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives, thus
Jêe 	  
     0; if f(v,)  (0, G(e) 
 t(ê)), I(v,)  (0,w).
With maximal fines (that is f(v,) 	 (G(e) 
 t(ê)), I(v,) 	 w), 
Jêe 	  
   0. Further, Jê 	 
  0 if f(v,)  (0, G(e) 

t(ê)), I(v,)  (0, w). With maximal fines Jê 	 
   
 0. (The sign of Jê follows from the fact that it is assumed that:
 0,  0,  0.)
Moreover, Jê 	 
    0 if f(v,)  (0,G(e) 
 t(ê)), I(v,) 
(0, w). (The sign follows from the fact that  0  0, 0.)
Note that Jê 	 0 if f(v,) 	 (G(e) 
 t(ê)), I(v,) 	 w, since in this case the
fines are lump sum and set at the maximum amount.
Finally, Je 	 
  0 if f(v,)  (0,G(e) 








































































To ensure that a unique maximum exists and is stable it is assumed that:
Jêe  0, Jee  0 and that |Jeê||Jêê|,|Jeê||Jee|.
Let  	 JeeJêê 
 J
2
êe  0 be the determinant of the 2  2 matrix in (A1).
Lemma 1a
	 
  0 f (v,)  (0, (G(e) 





 0 (the sign follows from the assumption that 
Jee  0 and that |Jeê||Jee|)
Lemma 2a
	  0  f(v,)  (0, G(e) 
 t(ê))], I(v,)  (0, w]
Lemma 2b




 F    
   
Appendix B
The Hamiltonian of the problem in (12a) and (12b) is
H 	 W(e)(e)  (e) (B1)
where (e) is the costate variable. Since there is an additional constraint
(12c), the problem can be solved by forming the Lagrangean (see, Leonard
and Long, 1992, Chapter 6)
L 	 H  (e)(F 
 (G 
 t(e)  w)) (B2)
where (e) is the Langrange multiplier.
The necessary conditions for a maximum are
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(e) 	 
 	 
(e)  (e) (B4)
	 (B5)
G 
 t(e)  w 	 F (B6)
Moreover we note that integrating both sides of (B4) yields
(e) 	 
(e)   e¯
e
(e) de (B7)
In a long-run steady state equilibrium ˙ 	 0, thus in (B4) (e) 	 (e) and
in (B7)
(e) 	 
(e)   e¯
e
(e) de 	 
(e)  (e) 	 0
Proposition 1b
Expanding terms in (B3) yields
 
  (e)  W 
 (e)  
  	 0 (B8)
Proposition 2
Rearrange (B5)
 	   (B9)
Differentiate with respect to e
	   (B10)
It has been assumed that  0. Moreover we have  0,  0, 
0. It follows from (B10) that a necessary condition for  0 is  0.
Proposition 3


































































































21 Note also that this condition always holds if it is assumed that the third derivatives
of variables are sufficiently small or zero. This assumption is often evoked in the
mechanism design literature as the third derivative appears to have no obvious
economic interpretation in this context (Laffont and Tirole, 1998, Chapter 1).
Proposition 4
We now show that when   ¯, then there is no feasible equilibrium tax. From
Lemma 3b when   ¯, then it is optimal to set the fine rate  	 0. From equa-
tion (4) when  	 0 then ê 	 0. Moreover from the incentive compatibility
constraint (9b), if  	 0, ê 	 0 and e  0 then (9b) can never hold for any t(e) 
0. Thus, there is no positive tax which satisfies the incentive compatibility con-
straint in this case.
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